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Executive Summary
As the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) undertakes its 2012 program review,
participating states have several important decisions to make. One key question is whether to
lower the cap that participating RGGI states have set on greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) to
better correspond with changed market conditions that have caused emissions in the region to be
lower than predicted. A related consideration is whether to adopt regulations on imported
electricity to control for “emissions leakage,” in order to ensure that emissions reduced in the
region do not simply spill over into neighboring states and provinces. These two decisions are
largely interrelated, as a lower cap is likely to increase the chances that significant emissions
leakage might occur. For purposes of this paper, we assume that RGGI states will pursue
imports regulations only if they have reason to be concerned that under the revised program,
emissions leakage is likely to be a serious problem.
Regulating leakage presents potential legal challenges: in our federal governmental
structure, states are limited by the Constitution in the extent to which they can regulate activities
occurring beyond their own borders, and may be preempted by federal statutes from regulating
certain interstate activities altogether. This paper analyzes the legal hurdles that RGGI may face
should it choose to address emissions leakage through regulating imported electricity. It focuses
on two legal issues in particular, which are generally thought to be the most likely arguments
raised against imports regulations: (1) whether imports regulations violate the dormant
Commerce Clause (DCC) of the Constitution; and (2) whether such regulations are preempted by
the Federal Power Act (FPA).
Our analysis concludes that imports regulations would likely be ruled constitutional on
both counts by a reviewing court. Although the DCC prohibits states from regulating
extraterritorially or in a manner that discriminates against interstate commerce, we believe that
properly crafted imports regulations are best interpreted as placing only permissible, comparable
requirements on imported electricity to those requirements already placed on in-state electricity
generators. Although imports regulations would require treating imports slightly differently
from in-state emissions for the purposes of monitoring and calculating emissions, these
differences would not likely amount to discrimination against out-of-state generators as a whole.
At most, imports regulations might disadvantage one set of out-of-state generators while
advantaging other out-of-state generators. Relevant Supreme Court precedent suggests that state
laws that merely shift comparative advantage in this manner are permissible under the DCC.
Moreover, we think it is likely that RGGI could defend imports regulations—if justified
by states as necessary to correct for a predicted leakage problem—as bringing participating states
benefits that are not outweighed by any incidental burdens placed on out-of-state generators.
Finally, we think it is unlikely that a court would strike imports regulations as preempted by the
FPA, as these regulations would only incidentally affect the interstate wholesale electricity
market and would not impede FERC’s ability to fully carry out its FPA responsibilities.
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INTRODUCTION
Progress in curbing greenhouse gases (GHGs) has been frustratingly slow both
internationally and at the federal level in the United States. Many U.S. states have responded by
tackling climate change themselves in a range of ways. Most notable are two efforts to create
sub-national cap-and-trade programs to regulate GHG emissions. In the northeast, ten states –
Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York, Rhode Island and Vermont – cooperated to form the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(RGGI) (though one of them, New Jersey, recently dropped out).1 Collectively, these states have
capped and will reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from the power sector 10 percent by
2018, relative to the CO2 allowance budget of 165 million short tons.2 California is also
implementing a cap-and-trade program, with compliance obligations to begin in 2013, as part of
its statewide effort to return the state to its 1990 levels of GHG emissions by 2020.3
These state and regional programs are commendable efforts at regulating an inherently
global problem. However, these smaller-scale efforts butt up against a worrisome potential
constraint on their effectiveness: the problem of “emissions leakage.” The implementation of a
carbon cap on electricity generators within a certain state or region can increase the cost of in-

1

REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://rggi.org/rggi (last visited June 26, 2012). New Jersey was a
member of RGGI until 2011, when Governor Chris Christie withdrew the state from the program.
2
REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org/docs/RGGI_Executive_Summary.pdf (last visited
July 10, 2012).
3
See Cal. Air Res. Bd., Resolution 07-55 (Dec. 6, 2007). California is also part of a regional effort to address
climate change, the Western Climate Initiative (WCI). However, the WCI has been slower than RGGI to coalesce
into a functional program. Although the initiative began in 2007 as a collaboration among Arizona, California, New
Mexico, Oregon, and Washington, and expanded to include Montana and Utah as well as the Canadian provinces of
British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, and Québec, the U.S. states other than California have all halted their
collaboration, either formally or informally. See About the WCI – History, WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE,
http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/history (last visited July 23, 2012). California is now the sole U.S. signatory
state moving forward, in collaboration with the participating Canadian provinces.
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region electricity generation.4 The electric grid, however, does not follow state lines – power can
be imported and exported across states. Therefore, when the cost of in-state or in-region
generation increases, it may have the effect of causing load-serving entities (LSEs)5 within a
state to shift their power purchases to uncontrolled and relatively cheaper fossil fuel-fired
generation outside of the regulated state or region.6 This shift from capped sources to uncapped
sources is described as “emissions leakage.”7
When designing a state or regional cap-and-trade program, regulators are faced with the
question of whether or not to regulate this potential leakage. If left unregulated, it has the
potential to undermine the regulated market “by distorting actual emissions levels and providing
incentives to shift, rather than reduce, GHG emissions.”8 In essence, leakage can mean that the
GHG emissions reductions achieved by a policy are lower than intended. However, choosing to
regulate leakage has its own challenges: in our federal governmental structure, states are limited
by the Constitution in the extent to which they can regulate activities occurring beyond their own
borders,9 and may be preempted by federal statutes from regulating certain interstate activities
altogether.10

4

DAVID FARNSWORTH, CHRISTINA PALMERO & CHRISTOPHER SHERRY, POTENTIAL EMISSIONS LEAKAGE AND THE
REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE (RGGI): EVALUATING MARKET DYNAMICS, MONITORING OPTIONS, AND
POSSIBLE MITIGATION MECHANISMS 3 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 RGGI REPORT], available at
http://www.rggi.org/docs/il_report_final_3_14_07.pdf.
5
A load-serving entity (LSE) is the “entity that arranges energy and transmission service to serve the electrical
demand and energy requirements of its end-use customers. In restructured states, such entities are not necessarily the
utilities that own transmission and distribution assets.” REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, ELECTRICITY
REGULATION IN THE U.S.: A GUIDE 112 (2011).
6
2007 RGGI REPORT, supra note 4.
7
Id.
8
SNULLER PRICE ET AL., ENERGY AND ENVTL. ECON., INC., ELECTRICITY LEAKAGE ANALYSIS SUMMARY REPORT 5
(2009).
9
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
10
See, e.g. the Federal Power Act, which reserves the power to regulate the interstate transmission and sale of
electricity to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-823 (2006).
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Faced with these competing concerns, RGGI and California have, so far, proceeded down
opposite paths. RGGI requires electricity generators in participating states of greater than 25
megawatts (MW) to purchase one allowance for each ton of carbon dioxide that they generate.
During its program design phase, RGGI chose to regulate only in-region generators, placing no
cap on emissions associated with electricity imported into the RGGI states from out-of-region
generation. This decision raised some concern over the possibility that leakage might offset a
large portion of RGGI’s emission reductions.11 However, during RGGI’s first three years of
operation, leakage appears not to have posed a significant a problem.12 This has been largely
attributed to the imposition of a cap much higher than actual emissions,13 which has depressed
allowance prices and thereby kept in-region generation relatively competitive with out-of-region
generation.14 RGGI is now in the middle of its 2012 program review, where it is considering,
among other issues, whether to tighten its cap.15 If RGGI tightens the cap to correspond with
actual emissions levels, allowance prices (i.e., the fee for CO2 emissions) would be expected to
increase, thereby increasing the probability of leakage. Under these circumstances, regulating
leakage would become much more important.

11

Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961,
1969-70 (2007) [hereinafter Think Globally] (citing The Magnificent Seven: States Take the Lead on Global
Warming, GRAPEVINE ONLINE, Jan. 17, 2006, http://www.aceee.org/about/0601rggi.htm).
12
NYISO: RGGI Has Not Caused GHG Increases in Nonparticipating States from Increased Imports,
POWERNEWS, Oct. 19, 2011, http://www.powermag.com/POWERnews/4115.html; see also James T. Gallagher,
NY Wholesale Electricity Markets & the Effect of RGGI on Imports, REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE (Oct.
11, 2011), http://www.rggi.org/docs/ProgramReview/LearningSession1/Presentation_James_Gallagher_NYISO.pdf.
13
RGGI At One Year: An Evaluation of the Design and Implementation of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative,
ENVIRONMENT NORTHEAST 3-4 (Feb. 2010), http://www.envne.org/public/resources/pdf/ENE_2009_RGGI_Evaluation_20100223_FINAL.pdf. The cap was originally set higher
than the historical emissions of member states because of assumptions that have subsequently proved inaccurate. In
particular, a steep decline in emissions has been attributed to low natural gas prices and the economic downturn.
14
Committee Report, Report of the Climate Change & Emissions Committee, 31 ENERGY L.J. 571 (2010).
15
REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, PROGRAM REVIEW, http://www.rggi.org/design/program_review/ (last
visited July 23, 2012)
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California, on the other hand, has chosen to regulate leakage by placing compliance
obligations on electricity imported into the state as well as generated in the state.16 California
likely chose to regulate leakage from the inception of its program due to the overwhelming
problem experts predicted it would otherwise face: Californians import about one-quarter of the
electricity they consume, and these imports are “disproportionately dirty, accounting for over
half of the CO2 credited to California electricity demand.”17 California’s imports regulations
have not yet faced a legal challenge, but many anticipate that as the program moves from
planning to implementation, challenges will be mounted.
As RGGI considers whether to adopt imports regulations for its program moving
forward, it may hesitate due to worries over the legality of any such scheme. This paper analyzes
the legal hurdles that RGGI may face should it choose to address emissions leakage through
regulating imported electricity. For purposes of this paper, we assume that RGGI would proceed
with imports regulations only if it tightened its cap or otherwise amended the program such that
emissions leakage became a more prominent concern.18 We make this assumption because
imports regulations would be harder to justify as a necessary component of RGGI if there were
no worry that emissions leakage was, in fact, occurring or likely to occur.19

16

We discuss the design of California’s imports regulations in more detail infra Part I. California regulators were in
fact required to select a program design to “minimize leakage” by the state’s comprehensive climate change bill, AB
32: California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006.
17
JAMES BUSHNELL, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF ENERGY MARKETS, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CALIFORNIA AB 32
AND ITS IMPACT ON WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS 5 (University of California Energy Institute, 2007),
available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/Bushnell.pdf
18
Although RGGI would not need to show a past leakage problem in order to justify adopting regulations to protect
against leakage, RGGI would want to at least be able to demonstrate via modeling or other research that emissions
leakage was likely to present concerns under a revised scheme.
19
Of course, states might want to enact imports regulations irrespective of worries over leakage due to fairness
concerns about the relative competitiveness of in-state and out-of-state firms. Our analysis does not consider
whether stand-alone imports regulations, adopted without any reforms to RGGI that would increase the potential for
leakage, would withstand a legal challenge. In that case, the dormant Commerce Clause analysis would differ from
the one presented here, in that the regulations could not be justified as necessary to maintain the environmental
effectiveness of the cap-and-trade program.
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This white paper focuses on two legal issues that are generally thought to be the most
likely arguments raised against imports regulations: (1) whether imports regulations violate the
dormant Commerce Clause (DCC) of the Constitution; and (2) whether such regulations are
preempted by the Federal Power Act (FPA). Based on the analysis that follows, we believe that
the imports regulations being considered by RGGI would likely be ruled constitutional on both
counts by a reviewing court.
Part I of this paper assesses potential design options for regulating GHG emissions
associated with electricity imported into the RGGI region. Part II analyzes the potential DCC
hurdles that each of these approaches may face. Part III examines any potential claims that
challengers may bring under the FPA. Finally, Part IV discusses a few additional legal issues
unique to Canadian imports that should be considered during the design phase of imports
regulations.
I.

DESIGN OPTIONS FOR MITIGATING LEAKAGE
We first examine the key design issues important to consider when drafting leakage

regulations. There are numerous ways to attempt to minimize leakage by reducing electricity
load, particularly through energy efficiency policies.20 Reduced demand helps keep cap-andtrade compliance costs low, which “reduce[s] the generation cost differential between electric
generators subject to a carbon cap and those that do not face a carbon constraint, which is

20

Such mechanisms include conservation efforts, energy efficiency portfolio standards, building energy codes and
standards, appliance and equipment energy efficiency standards, combined heat and power systems, carbon
procurement adders, carbon procurement emissions rates, and emissions portfolio standards. For more information
on these indirect leakage control mechanisms, see 2007 RGGI REPORT, supra note 4, at 1; see also CAL. AIR RES.
BD. FOR THE STATE OF CAL., CLIMATE CHANGE SCOPING PLAN (2009) [hereinafter CARB SCOPING PLAN], available
at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/document/adopted_scoping_plan.pdf; COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL CENTER
FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSIONS & ENERGY EFFICIENCY: A HANDBOOK OF LEGAL AND
REGULATORY TOOLS FOR COMMISSIONERS & ADVOCATES (August 2012), available at (forthcoming; link should be
available by the time paper is finalized) (cataloguing tools that state public utilities commissions can utilize to
promote energy efficiency).
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expected to mitigate potential leakage.”21 However, if regulators decide that these indirect
means of helping to alleviate leakage are insufficient to deal with the scope of the leakage
problem a state or region faces, then a focus on imports is necessary. Imports regulations assign
compliance obligations to in-state providers of electricity purchased from beyond state borders
that are similar to those obligations imposed on electricity generated in-state. There are two main
design options that have been proposed to regulate imports: the First Jurisdictional Deliverer
(FJD) approach, and the load-based cap approach.
These two approaches differ primarily in the point at which the regulation is taking place.
Where along the supply chain is the point of compliance for the enforcement of GHG
reductions? Under an FJD approach, compliance obligations are placed on whoever first delivers
electricity into the state or region’s grid, be it an in-state generator, an LSE importing power, or a
wholesale marketer importing power. In contrast, under a load-based cap, the compliance
obligation for imports is placed solely on LSEs, which are assigned the emissions from imports
that they purchase.22 In practical terms, the choice to place the obligation on FJDs or LSEs does
not raise distinct legal challenges, but it might make a difference in terms of how easy it is for
RGGI to monitor and regulate the system. The details of these two approaches are described in
turn below.
a. First Jurisdictional Deliverer Approach
Under an FJD framework, responsibility for emissions arising from imported electricity is
assigned to those entities that first import power into the regulated region. These entities would
be labeled as “importing firms.”23 Conceptually, the FJD approach is a regulatory expansion of a

21

2007 RGGI REPORT, supra note 4, at 27.
BUSHNELL, supra note 17, at 7.
23
Id. at 2.
22

10

source-based approach to regulating GHG emissions. In-state or in-region generators are still
responsible for their own emissions, as with a traditional cap-and-trade system.24 The FJD
simply adds an additional layer of regulated entities to cover those emissions associated with
imports.
California is the only example of how the FJD approach might be implemented in
practice. Its regulations define a “first jurisdictional deliverer” or “first deliverer” as “the
operator of an electricity generating facility in California or an electricity importer.”25 In other
words, the “FJD” is either an in-state generator or the first entity that delivers imported
electricity into California over which the state has regulatory authority.26 The “importer” of
electricity can be identified for each transaction of electricity by information gathered from
North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) e-Tags, which are used by NERC to
track load and monitor transactions of electricity as it is scheduled to flow across parts of the
country.27 “Electricity importers” can be divided into two categories: (1) electric utilities, or
“retail providers,” including LSEs, which use the imports for their own power supply;28 and (2)
wholesale power “marketers,” which supply electricity in the spot market.29 The regulations
thereby place compliance obligations on the entity with title to electricity at the point of delivery

24

Id.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 § 95802(a)(103), available at
http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2010/capandtrade10/finalrevfro.pdf.
26
California Air Resources Board, Including Imported Electricity in a California Cap-and-Trade Program 8 (2009),
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/meetings/060509pm/presentation.pdf.
27
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 § 95802(a)(170).
28
Utilities may or may not physically own transmission assets, and their ownership of such assets is beside the point
for purposes of imports regulations. Utilities are defined as “importers” for that power which they contractually
purchase on behalf of their end-use customers, irrespective of whether they also own the transmission lines over
which the power is transported into the state. See supra note 5.
29
See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 § 95802(a)(87). Wholesale power marketers are those entities that buy wholesale
power from generators and resell it to retail entities for consumption by consumers. These marketers may or may
not physically own any generation, transmission, or distribution assets. See What is a Wholesale Electricity
Market?, Electric Power Supply Association, at http://www.epsa.org/industry/primer/?fa=wholesaleMarket (last
visited Aug. 6, 2012).
25
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into California, irrespective of what entity owns the transmission capacity that the imported
electricity is moving across. As applied to first deliverers, California’s cap-and-trade scheme
requires both electric utilities and wholesale power marketers to obtain a sufficient number of
allowances to cover the emissions associated with load supplied by these entities to Californians,
from out-of-state generators.
In order to successfully implement an FJD approach to address leakage, a regulator needs
to be able to track and monitor two key pieces of information: 1) the amount of electricity that is
imported into and consumed within the state or regulated region,30 and 2) the GHG emissions
associated with those imports. While pre-existing NERC regulations allow California to monitor
load being imported into and consumed within the state, the state needed an additional
mechanism for attributing GHG emissions to particular loads. Thus California created a
distinction between “specified” and “unspecified” transactions of electricity. 31 Specified
transactions are typically comprised of bilateral contracts between out-of-state generators and instate electricity providers where a delivery path and the parties can be identified. Since the
generating plant is known, it is relatively easy to assign emissions to load being served into
California. On the other hand, unspecified transactions reflect load imported into the region
where it is unclear specifically where the power originated. Under these circumstances,

30

This also necessitates being able to differentiate between electricity that is consumed within the regulated region
and electricity that is “wheeled through” the region in order to serve demand elsewhere. California monitors – but
does not regulate – electricity that travels through the state but is consumed elsewhere and excludes this electricity
from reported imports and exports. GREENHOUSE GAS REPORTER TRAINING ELECTRIC POWER ENTITIES,
CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD 39 (Apr. 26, 2012), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/reporting/ghgrep/tool/power_regreqs_1page.pdf.
31
See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 § 95802(a)(264) (“‘Specified Source of Electricity’ or ‘Specified Source’ means a
facility or unit which is permitted to be claimed as the source of electricity delivered.”); id. at § 95802(a)(278)
(“‘Unspecified Source of Electricity’ or ‘Unspecified Source’ means electricity generation that cannot be matched to
a specific electricity generating facility or electricity generating unit or matched to an asset-controlling supplier
recognized by ARB. Unspecified sources contribute to the bulk system power pool and typically are dispatchable,
marginal resources that do not serve baseload.”).
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California makes certain modeling assumptions about generation and related emissions in
neighboring power systems and develops a “default emissions rate” that it attributes to
unspecified load. Under California’s default assumptions, all unspecified imports are assigned a
regional default emission factor of 1,100 pounds of CO2e/MWh produced,32 regardless of the
geographic region from which the electricity is imported.33 This default factor is determined
based on a range of assumptions about what types of sources do, and do not, supply power into
wholesale markets.34
b. Load-Based Approach
The main alternative to the FJD approach is to adopt a “load-based” approach to
regulating imports. Under this approach, the LSE, rather than the importer, is the point of
imports regulation. In other words, the main distinction between an FJD and a load-based
approach is that under the former, compliance obligations for imports attach to those “first
deliverers” over which the state or region exercises jurisdiction – a larger set of entities than just
LSEs. There is no functioning example of a state regulating imports through the load-based
approach. However, there have been recommendations that RGGI look closely at the load-based
approach as the method perhaps best suited to its geographical and technical situation.
32

CO2e, or CO2 equivalent, is “the concentration of CO2 that would cause the same amount of radiative forcing as a
given mixture of CO2 and other forcing components.” NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CLIMATE STABILIZATION
TARGETS: EMISSIONS, CONCENTRATIONS, AND IMPACTS OVER DECADES TO MILLENNIA 11 (2011).
33
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, FINAL OPINION ON GREENHOUSE GAS
REGULATORY STRATEGIES 54 (2008), available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdf/FINAL_DECISION/92591.pdf.
34
For reference, this value is significantly lower than the average emission factor of 2,249 lbs CO 2/MWh from coalfired generation in the United States and even a little less than that of all natural gas facilities, which comes in at
1,135 lbs CO2/MWh. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, CLEAN ENERGY,
http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-and-you/affect/air-emissions.html (last visited July 10, 2012). However, it
is slightly greater than the average emissions factor of new combined cycle natural gas (NGCC), which “emits the
least amount of CO2 and does so at the least cost.” Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions for
New Stationary Sources, 77 Fed. Reg. 22,392, 22,398 (proposed Apr. 13, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60),
available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-0660-0001. NGCC facilities are
expected to easily meet the 1,000 lbs CO2/MWh new source performance standard currently being proposed by the
EPA. Id. at 22,399 (“the proposed standard of performance in today’s rulemaking . . . is based on the emission rate
of a new NGCC unit”).
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Under the load-based approach, LSEs are assigned the emissions of the out-of-state
sources from which they purchase power.35 Similar to first deliverers under California’s FJD
approach, LSEs have to acquire and surrender CO2 allowances in an amount that reflects the CO2
content of the energy that they purchase. Therefore, as in an FJD scheme, regulators must be able
to track both quantities of imports and the emissions associated with those imports.
A load-based approach faces the same challenge as an FJD approach in determining the
emissions associated with particular imports, as not all electricity imports are traceable to a
specific source; in many cases, an LSE can trace its purchase only to a wholesale power system.
Therefore, a load-based approach also requires adopting some sort of assumptions about system
emissions—which we will call an “emissions factor”—to attach to imported energy. For
purposes of this paper, we assume that RGGI states, in coordination with their independent
system operators (ISOs) and regional transmission organizations (RTOs), could achieve the
technical capabilities necessary in order to be able to track specifically (a) imported energy that
would be subject to RGGI’s cap-and-trade program, i.e. coming from fossil-fuel fired generation
25 MW and larger;36 and (b) the emissions attributes associated with out-of-region specific
generators and system power, including the assignment of an “emissions factor” to unspecified
imports.37

35

BUSHNELL, supra note 17, at 8.
We assume that in order to treat in-region and out-of-region generation as evenly as possible, RGGI will only
regulate power coming from out-of-region generators that are greater than 25 MW in size (as in-region generators
below this size are exempted from RGGI regulations).
37
“Out-of-region power” includes load being imported into the RGGI region from Canadian provinces. In order to
avoid any constitutional issues associated with emissions data collection, it will be important that ISOs/RTOs§ not
impose direct obligations on out-of-state generators to report emissions to regulators. Emissions data should be
available for U.S. electricity imported into the RGGI region; more challenging is the question of how RGGI could
obtain the emissions data necessary to track imports’ emissions and calculate an “emissions factor” for Canadian
imports. While the technical issues of how to obtain such data are beyond the scope of this paper, we did want to
note that such data would need to be obtained cooperatively, rather than through imposing any extraterritorial
reporting obligations, in order to avoid constitutional problems.
36
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c. Resource Shuffling
Under either an FJD or load-based imports regulation scheme, the important additional
issue of limiting the potential for gaming the system must be addressed. In particular, imports
regulations are potentially subject to manipulation through what experts have termed “resource
shuffling.”
As mentioned earlier, the United States is served by a network of interconnected
interstate electrical grids, where electrons can flow in complex paths that make tracing them
back to a particular source impossible.38 Accordingly, the use of bilateral electricity contracts,
where a specified source sells to a specified buyer, is in a way sort of fiction: the paper contract
creates an obligation for the source to supply a certain amount of electricity to the grid, and a
right for the buyer to remove this same amount from the grid, but the same electrons are not
necessarily added and removed by these two parties.
This physical reality creates the potential for gaming through “resource shuffling.”
Resource shuffling refers to the incentives created by imports regulations for out-of-state
generators to “shuffle” the assignment of existing sources so that those sources with relatively
lower emissions are assigned to a regulated region, in order for suppliers to comply with a
carbon cap. In exchange, relatively dirtier sources that used to serve load in the regulated region
are “shuffled” to meet demand elsewhere.
Recall that under either an FJD or load-based approach, imports either are treated as
“specified” and therefore as coming from a particular source, or “unspecified” and assigned an
“emissions factor.” This design naturally creates a tendency for importers to try to achieve
“specified” status for all of their imports that have emissions below the level of the emissions
38

H. Joseph Drapalinski, The Viability of Interstate Collaboration in the Absence of Federal Climate Change
Legislation, 21 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 469, 481 (2011) (quoting Think Globally, supra note 11, at 1969).
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factor associated with the system. Out-of-state generators that hold a mix of generating assets,
some cleaner and some dirtier than the system average, may therefore contractually assign their
clean power as being sold to LSEs or importers in a regulated state or region, while assigning
more carbon-intensive power to fully out-of-region sales.39 An electricity supplier can thereby
give the appearance that it is supplying clean power into a regulated region without actually
changing its emissions profile at all. Since resource shuffling can severely undermine the goals
of a regime aiming to reduce GHG emissions, adopting regulations to prevent it is a critical
element of a successful cap-and-trade scheme.
In California, the California Air Resources Board designed rules to counteract this threat,
including explicitly prohibiting resource shuffling in its regulations.40 It has also limited out-ofstate sources’ ability to engage in “specified” contracts with FJDs. California’s regulations allow
an FJD to claim that the power it is importing comes from a specified source only if 1) the source
has historically exported to California, 2) the source is a hydropower facility that is federally
owned or otherwise allocated by contract with the federal government, or 3) generation is being
imported from new facilities or new capacity at existing facilities. If the contract in question fails
to meet one or more of these exceptions, then load served under its terms will be labeled as
“unspecified” and assigned the default emissions rate.41
39
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41
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A similar resource shuffling prohibition would be necessary in a load-based scheme.
Otherwise, out-of-state generators could engage in the same kind of resource shuffling in their
contracts with LSEs as they might with FJDs, shifting contractual assignments so that it appeared
that RGGI was being served by clean resources without actually changing generation mix. If
RGGI adopted a load-based scheme, it would therefore almost certainly want to supplement this
scheme with resource shuffling regulations. In practice, these regulations would likely closely
resemble California’s rules, requiring LSEs to apply an emissions factor to unspecified contracts,
with further rules allowing specified contracts only to exist when the imports can be shown to
come from a historical contract path, the creation of a new facility, or the expansion of existing
facilities.
II.

DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
With this background in place, we now turn to an examination of the primary topic of this

paper: the legal issues that RGGI’s adoption of some form of the above-described imports
regulations might raise. The first and most important issue is the extent to which imports
regulations might violate the dormant Commerce Clause. Second, and in our opinion of less
concern, is the extent to which imports regulations might encroach upon the federal
government’s jurisdiction over interstate transmission of electricity and wholesale electricity
markets, as provided by the FPA (addressed in Part III). Finally, we briefly address potential
issues raised by regulating the cross-border transmission of electricity between RGGI states and
Canada (Part IV).42

RGGI is that if RGGI states should choose to pursue imports regulations, they should consider how to build in
adequate specificity to give regulated entities and FERC confidence in precisely what the rules prohibit and permit.
42
We do not consider in this analysis whether individual RGGI states have the legal authority, under existing state
legislation, to pass regulations combating leakage.
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a. Overview of the Doctrine
The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”43 The Commerce Clause has
long been interpreted to contain a negative component, the so-called “dormant” Commerce
Clause, which limits states’ ability to impose burdens on interstate commerce.44
Courts take several steps when determining whether a state law comports with the
dormant Commerce Clause. First, the court considers whether a statute or regulation is either
facially or effectively discriminatory against out-of-state interests. If so, the court applies a strict
scrutiny test when evaluating that law’s constitutionality. Separately, the court will also examine
whether a law regulates extraterritorially. If it does, the law will be invalidated. If a law is not
discriminatory and does not regulate extraterritorially, the court applies the more lenient Pike
balancing test in deciding whether the law is constitutional. The Supreme Court has also carved
out an exception to the dormant Commerce Clause, providing that a statute will be upheld if it
functions by placing the enacting State in the role of a market participant. The following
subsections describe each of these analytical steps in more detail.
1. Discrimination and Extraterritorial Regulation
The first question asked by a court conducting a dormant commerce clause analysis is
whether the law at issue discriminates against out-of-state interests, “either on its face or in
practical effect.”45 If so, such a law is considered “virtually per se” invalid.46
“Discrimination” in this context refers to “differential treatment of in-state and out-ofstate economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.”47 In order to be
43
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discriminatory, a statute must afford this differential treatment to “substantially similar
entities.”48 This is because, without such similarity, it is entirely possible that two entities would
continue to serve different markets absent the allegedly discriminatory burden.49 The challenger
bears the initial burden of demonstrating that a statute is discriminatory.50 When a court does
find discrimination, “the extent of the discrimination . . . is of no relevance to the determination
whether a State has discriminated against interstate commerce,” at least in the context of a
facially discriminatory statute.51
The key inquiry in determining whether a statute is discriminatory is whether it operates
to effect economic protectionism in favor of in-state interests.52 Outright bans on imports
generally fail under this test, as do laws that create obvious preferences for in-state entities. For
example, in City of Philadelphia, the Supreme Court held that a statute that banned the
importation of out-of-state waste was both facially and effectively discriminatory.53 The Court
ruled that New Jersey could not preserve its landfill space by overtly discriminating against an
article of commerce (the out-of-state waste) based solely on its origin.54 Likewise, in Camps
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Maine, the Court held that a law that provided
more favorable tax treatment to a nonprofit church camp primarily serving intrastate clientele,
than to those camps primarily serving interstate clientele, was facially discriminatory.55 The
Court reasoned that this differential treatment created a burden that ultimately fell on out-of-
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staters, deterring them from enjoying the benefits of camping in Maine, and was thus
discriminatory.56
Once a statute is determined to be discriminatory, courts apply what is nominally referred
to as a “strict scrutiny” standard in evaluating that statute.57 In order to survive, a state must
justify the law in terms of legitimate “local benefits” and the “unavailability of
nondiscriminatory alternatives” that would effectuate the statute’s goals.58 Courts uphold statutes
subject to this level of scrutiny in only the rarest of circumstances.59 One of the few times the
Supreme Court has upheld a discriminatory statute was in Maine v. Taylor.60 In that case, Maine
had enacted a statute prohibiting the importation of live baitfish.61 The Court acknowledged that
this ban facially discriminated against interstate trade.62 Nevertheless, the Court upheld the
statute because a parasite common to out-of-state baitfish could disrupt Maine’s ecology, and
there was no way to effectively test live baitfish for this parasite.63 Thus, the Court held that
although the statute was discriminatory, Maine had a reason distinct from that of origin to treat
out-of-state baitfish differently than in-state baitfish.64
A law may also be struck down if it is deemed an extraterritorial regulation and therefore
impermissible.65 A statute is considered an extraterritorial regulation when it applies to
commerce occurring entirely outside of the enacting state’s borders, even if that commerce has
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effects within the enacting state as well.66 In deciding whether the effect of a statute is
extraterritorial regulation, the Court considers the consequences of the statute itself and the
effects that would arise if many states adopted similar legislation.67 A state specifically may not
require an out-of-state merchant to seek approval in one State before engaging in a transaction in
another or adopt legislation which, in effect, establishes a price-scale in other states.68
Extraterritorial regulations are per se invalid, regardless of whether this reach beyond the state’s
borders was intended.69
An illustrative example of an impermissible extraterritorial regulation is the statute at
issue in Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Authority.70 The New York law at
issue in Brown-Forman required any distiller or agent who wished to sell alcoholic beverages to
a wholesaler in the state to file a price schedule.71 That schedule would take effect in the second
month after filing, and all sales made during the applicable month were required to be at the
prices specified therein.72 The law also required any distiller or agent who filed a price schedule
to affirm that the prices contained therein were no higher than the lowest price at which the item
was being sold in any other state during the month the schedule was in effect.73 Thus, the law
prevented distillers from lowering prices of liquor in other states while the posted price in New
York was in effect.74 The Court found this law unconstitutional because it effectively regulated
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the price of sales occurring entirely outside of New York, and required distillers to seek New
York’s approval in order to conduct wholly out-of-state sales as they wished.75
2. Pike Balancing
When a statute is determined not to be discriminatory or to effectuate extraterritorial
regulation, but burdens interstate commerce, an evaluating court applies the more lenient
standard articulated in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.76 The Pike test provides that a statute with
some effect on out-of-state commerce may be upheld so long as it 1) regulates even-handedly, 2)
effectuates a legitimate local public interest, 3) affects interstate commerce only incidentally, and
4) does not impose a burden on interstate commerce that is clearly in excess of the putative local
benefits.77 “State laws frequently survive this Pike scrutiny, . . . though not always.”78 The Pike
inquiry is extremely fact intensive, not easily susceptible to generalization. This paper will
explore the Pike balancing test as it specifically applies to leakage regulation in Part II(b)(iii).
3. Market Participant Exception
Finally, it is worth noting that the Supreme Court has carved out an exception to the
dormant Commerce Clause in those instances where a state acts as a market participant. As it has
explained, “[n]othing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State . . . from
participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others.”79 As
such, a state participating in the interstate market may choose not to deal with other parties as it
sees fit.80 The market participant exception, however, would not come into play during a
challenge to imports regulations, as it only is implicated when the state itself is acting as a
75
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commercial entity.81 In the case of RGGI states choosing to regulate imports, the states would
not be acting as market participants, but rather imposing regulatory requirements on certain
commercial transactions occurring within their borders. Some of the entities on whom
compliance obligations would be placed might be able to claim market participant status, as in
the case of municipal utilities like the Long Island Power Authority in New York.82 However,
the fact that states might be acting as “market participant with respect to one portion of a
program while operating as a market regulator in implementing another” would not be enough to
save imports regulations from a dormant Commerce Clause challenge.83 And imposing
compliance obligations on state-owned entities alone would not accomplish the goal of fully
preventing leakage, and would likely be politically unattractive. Accordingly, we do not believe
that the market participant exception would provide a full and valid defense to a dormant
Commerce Clause challenge to imports regulations, and for that reason we do not discuss the
exception in further detail.
b. Dormant Commerce Clause Application
We now consider whether RGGI states can adopt imports regulations while also
conforming to the requirements of the dormant Commerce Clause. In order to conduct this
analysis, we make some basic assumptions about the type of imports regulations that RGGI
might adopt. First, while it is uncertain if RGGI will decide that the appropriate point of
regulation is LSEs or FJDs, we believe that the distinction is largely irrelevant for Commerce
Clause purposes. Even though some FJDs are closer than LSEs to out-of-state entities in the
81
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chain of commerce, this distinction does not speak to the practical effect the regulations would
have on interstate commerce.
We assume that irrespective of which entity it chooses to regulate, RGGI will apply an
emissions factor to all unspecified energy provided to either FJDs or LSEs. This could be
applied uniformly to all imports—as is the case in California—or it could be more narrowly
calculated to account for imports coming from different regions with different generation mixes
and thus emissions rates. This distinction may implicate certain dormant Commerce Clause
issues, as discussed below. We further assume that, in order to prevent resource shuffling, all
energy provided by out-of-state generators will be deemed “unspecified” with the exceptions of
energy procured based on a historical agreement with an out-of-state source, from a new energy
source, or from incremental capacity at an existing energy facility.84 Finally, we assume that
RGGI states will maintain their current method of source-based emission caps on electricity
generated in-state.85
We believe that the regulation of resource shuffling—via application of a system-based
emissions factor and limitations on specified contracts—is the most contentious element of
imports regulations for dormant Commerce Clause purposes, and will thus focus the majority of
our analysis on that issue. For the sake of brevity, we will refer to the use of a system-based
emissions factor coupled with limited specified contracts as “resource shuffling regulations” for
the remainder of this analysis.
It may also be helpful to say a word up front about who the potential challengers to any
resource shuffling regulations might be. In general, the most likely aggrieved parties are out-of84
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region generators whose exports to the RGGI states would be subject to new regulations, or more
precisely, the consumption of whose product is regulated within an adjacent state. Although all
out-of-region generators might object, certain types of generators might have greater grounds for
objection: any out-of-region generator whose generation portfolio was cleaner than the
emissions factor applied to it, but who did not have historical specified contracts, might protest
that it was being disadvantaged by having the emissions factor applied to its RGGI exports.
Finally, states that are exporters to the RGGI region and whose generators might face a decrease
in the amount of power that RGGI LSEs decide to import might also find reasons to object.
Ultimately, as we explain below, we believe any challenges would likely prove
unsuccessful. Because these hypothetical resource shuffling regulations would not involve any
transactions occurring entirely out-of-state, a court would probably not find them
unconstitutional as an extraterritorial regulation. We likewise believe that a court would find that
these regulations do not discriminate against out-of-state commerce, as they impose a cost on
FJDs or LSEs who import electricity that is comparable to the cost already imposed on in-state
generators subject to RGGI’s cap-and-trade system. If this is correct, and a reviewing court
ultimately applied the Pike balancing test to these regulations, we believe that, since the
regulations do not present burdens disproportionate to their benefits and would not obviously
result in a shift in demand from out-of-state electricity to in-state electricity, a court would
uphold the regulations as a constitutionally valid exercise of state power.
1. Imports regulations should survive an extraterritoriality challenge.
To be invalidated as an extraterritorial action in violation of the dormant Commerce
Clause, a statute typically must regulate activity that is not at all occurring within its own
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borders. 86 As the point of compliance for RGGI’s resource shuffling regulations would be either
FJDs or LSEs – in-state entities in either situation –it is unlikely that a court would characterize
the regulations as occurring “wholly outside of the State's borders.”87 Out-of-state generators
would not be required to alter their practices in any way as a result of these regulations. As such,
the regulations could not legitimately be characterized as regulating wholly out-of-state
transactions.
Perhaps the strongest—though probably ultimately unavailing—argument in favor of
extraterritoriality is that RGGI, by regulating imports, would impermissibly be trying to regulate
how out-of-state entities go about producing electricity. This position might find support in the
recent Eastern District of California decision in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene.88
There, the court invalidated the state’s low carbon fuel standard (LCFS) on several grounds,
including the fact that it interpreted the regulation as controlling conduct occurring wholly
outside of California by grading imported fuels based on a range of components that include
farming practices, harvesting practices, and “land use change” scores.89 The court reasoned that
because “the aim of the LCFS is to change these practices to reduce GHG emissions,” the
regulation impermissibly attempted to “control conduct beyond the boundary of the state.”90
We are unconvinced that this particular interpretation of the extraterritoriality doctrine is
correct or applicable to RGGI imports regulations. In the extraterritoriality examples we
presented earlier, state regulations had a direct impact on out-of-state conduct, for example by
controlling when and at what levels prices could be set in other states. This type of
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extraterritorial effect is quite different from the attenuated incentives that RGGI imports
regulations would provide. At most, by requiring LSEs or FJDs to purchase GHG allowances to
account for the emissions associated with the energy they import, resource shuffling regulations
would impact the price that LSEs/FJDs might be willing to pay for particular types of out-ofregion power. However, it is well established that a “[m]ere ‘upstream pricing impact’ is not a
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause, even if the impact is felt out-of-state where the
stream originates.”91 This upstream pricing effect alone therefore should not cause a court to
invalidate resource shuffling regulations.
The Supreme Court has also invalidated state laws as extraterritorial regulations when
those affected activities could be subjected to inconsistent regulations if many states adopted
similar legislation.92 On this point, out-of-state generators might argue that RGGI imports
regulations would subject them to the laws of RGGI states in addition to their home states. This
argument ignores the fact that out-of-state generators will themselves face no compliance
obligations under either an FJD or load-based imports regulation scheme—all obligations will
fall either on in-region FJDs or LSEs.
The more pertinent question, then, is whether FJDs or LSEs might be subject to
inconsistent regulations if many states adopted similar legislation. The strongest argument
against the regulations that might be mounted here is that a wholesale power marketer or utility
serving customers in multiple states might face different compliance obligations in each state, to
the extent that states outside of RGGI decided to adopt similar regimes. However, this fact alone
is not likely enough to create a risk of inconsistent obligations—to the contrary, utilities
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operating in multiple states already face considerable regulatory burdens in each one that are not
uniform. The fact that other states might also adopt cap-and-trade regulations with imports
obligations would not create inconsistent obligations because an LSE or FJD would never be
subject to multiple regulations for the same power. Because RGGI would only regulate power
being consumed within the RGGI region, and no state outside the RGGI region could
constitutionally impose requirements on power consumed inside RGGI, there is no real risk of
inconsistent obligations. Although LSEs or FJDs might face different imports compliance
obligations in different states (and right now, even this possibility is a distant hypothetical), there
does not seem to be a likelihood that the obligations created would be inconsistent, such that
RGGI states would be “project[ing] [their] legislation into other States.”93
2. Resource shuffling regulations are likely not discriminatory.
Since resource shuffling regulations would not likely be invalidated based on the
extraterritorial reach doctrine, a court would next consider whether RGGI’s regulatory scheme is
discriminatory on its face, in purpose, or in effect.94 In order to be discriminatory, a law must
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burden out-of-state entities and benefit in-state entities that are similarly situated.95 In the context
of resource shuffling regulations, those similarly situated entities would presumably be in-state
and out-of-state generators. A challenger would thus bear the burden of demonstrating that outof-state generators face hurdles not comparably levied upon in-state generators that wish to serve
the relevant state’s electricity market.96 This burden must functionally evince economic
protection in favor of those in-state interests.97
The sorts of regulations which have most commonly been ruled discriminatory are those
which either explicitly reserved part of a market for in-state interests, 98 banned imports or
exports of goods,99 or enacted differential tax schemes on in-state and out-of-state interests for
the benefit of the former.100 The most blatant of these violations, a flat ban on imports, is not at
issue here. What is at issue is the fact that only out-of-state generators would have their
emissions subject to resource shuffling regulations, including assumptions about a system’s
emissions factor and limitations on what contracts could be “specified.” However, as explained
below, because application of an emissions factor is intended only to ensure that imports are
treated comparably to in-state generation sources, we believe it is unlikely that a court would
find resource shuffling regulations discriminatory.
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i. Resource shuffling regulations treat in-state and out-ofstate electricity generation comparably.
Challengers will likely argue that making FJDs or LSEs responsible for emissions
associated with their out-of-region electricity purchases based on emissions factor assumptions
would disincentivize interstate commerce. In perhaps the most relevant precedent supporting this
position, Healy v. Beer Institute, the Supreme Court considered a Connecticut statute that
required out-of-state beer shippers to post monthly statewide wholesale beer prices and to affirm
that their posted prices were, at the moment of posting, no higher than the prices they charged in
neighboring states.101 The Court invalidated this statute on multiple grounds, including the fact
that it was facially discriminatory because it applied only to interstate brewers or shippers,
creating a disincentive for companies doing business in Connecticut to also engage in the
interstate market.102 However, successfully analogizing resource shuffling regulations to the sort
of disincentive-effect described in Beer Institute would not be straightforward.
If a court viewed resource shuffling regulations as an attempt to force in-state purchases,
it might prove fatal to the regulations.103 But such an interpretation of imports regulations would
be a mischaracterization, for several important reasons. First, it is not clear that resource
shuffling regulations would in fact deter FJDs or LSEs from importing electricity. Certainly,
such rules would not deter FJDs or LSEs from entering into permissible specified contracts with
out-of-state generators that have relatively clean emissions profiles, as this generation might well
be cheaper than in-region generation subject to the RGGI cap.
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Of course, per design, FJDs and LSEs would face an additional administrative burden
when importing power, given that they would have new obligations to purchase RGGI
allowances to cover associated emissions (whereas under RGGI’s current design, LSEs are not
burdened with any compliance obligations, which are placed solely on in-state generators).
Nevertheless, this purposeful change in incentives hardly amounts to the kind of scheme
invalidated in Healy, because there would be no more freedom accorded to in-state electricity
contracts than to out-of-state ones.
RGGI states’ strongest argument against allegations of discrimination stems from the
existing cap on GHG emissions imposed on in-state generators. It cannot be overemphasized that
the central goal of the dormant Commerce Clause is to prevent economic protectionism.104 In
City of Philadelphia, using reasoning similar to that later employed in Beer Institute, the Court
struck down a ban on waste imports because it believed that New Jersey was attempting to
isolate itself from the interstate economy and impose the full burden of conserving landfill space
on out-of-state commercial interests.105 The Court refused to allow New Jersey to solve its own
problems at the expense of other states.106 This logic does not extend to resource shuffling
regulations. Far from attempting to impose full burdens out-of-state, RGGI states have already
implemented caps on in-state generators’ GHG emissions. But in-state obligations are not alone
sufficient to reduce the carbon footprint of participating RGGI states—resource shuffling
regulations are one necessary piece of the regulatory puzzle in order to ensure that RGGI
achieves its environmental objectives.
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If challengers argue that resource shuffling regulations should be viewed in isolation of
the existing limits placed on in-state generators, Supreme Court precedent will not support their
position. In West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, the Court considered a regulatory regime in
which all Massachusetts milk dealers (both in-state and out-of-state companies) were required to
pay a non-discriminatory tax, and in-state producers of milk were granted a subsidy.107 The
Court granted Massachusetts its premise that both the tax and the subsidy were independently
constitutional,108 yet refused to “analyze separately two parts of an integrated regulation.”109 Just
as the Court viewed Massachusetts’ regulatory regime holistically in order to find it
unconstitutional, it should also be willing to consider the entire scope of RGGI’s regulations.
Despite any initial appearance that resource shuffling regulations are discriminatory against outof-state generators, when considered within the existing scheme of source-based regulations
already in place, a court should recognize that no such discrimination in fact exists.
RGGI states will find additional support for this holistic approach in the Supreme Court’s
compensatory tax doctrine. Under this line of cases, “a facially discriminatory tax that imposes
on interstate commerce the equivalent of an identifiable and substantially similar tax on intrastate
commerce does not offend the negative Commerce Clause.”110 In order to qualify, the tax must
be imposed on “substantially equivalent event[s].”111 It is a matter of some dispute whether
RGGI itself is a “tax”; although this issue was raised in recent litigation in New York state court,
the case was dismissed for lack of standing and the issue was not reached.112 But RGGI need not
be characterized as a tax in order to gain persuasive authority from the compensatory tax
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doctrine. The doctrine’s underlying justification— that it is acceptable to make interstate
commerce bear the same level of burden as intrastate commerce113—should buttress the
contention that imports regulations are permissible because they impose substantially equivalent
requirements on in- and out-of-region electricity.
Opponents of import regulations may advance the argument that even taken as a whole,
the burden upon interstate commerce exceeds that imposed on intrastate commerce, which is
fatal under the compensatory tax doctrine.114 They would point out that while in-state generators
are subject to a cap on emissions and must themselves purchase allowances, they can sell as
much electricity as they wish to FJDs or LSEs, without the purchasing entity having to fulfill any
compliance obligations. Thus, they may argue that imports regulations make it more difficult for
out-of-state generators to sell electricity to RGGI-regulated FJDs or LSEs.
RGGI states could best combat this point by arguing that even though the obligations are
different, the end result is a GHG-based limitation on electricity generation, accomplished
through slightly different, but comparable, mechanisms. Even granting that in-state generators
would have an easier time completing the actual sale of electricity, they would have a more
difficult time generating the electricity in the first place, since they are subject to direct
compliance obligations. Thus, the ultimate effect of both the in-state source-based cap and the
allowance obligations imposed on FJDs or LSEs is to burden generators at equivalent levels.
Furthermore, the reality is that since all compliance obligations related to the resource shuffling
regulations would fall on either FJDs or LSEs, out-of-state generators would not in fact face any
new obligations at the point of sale. They could, at most, face a decrease in demand due to the
indirect pricing implications of the FJD/LSE mandate to purchase GHG allowances in tandem
113
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with imported electricity—an equivalent effect to the one already felt by in-state generators who
must purchase allowances accounting for their own emissions.
As discussed previously, part of RGGI’s attempts to prevent resource shuffling may
include limiting those instances when imported electricity can be classified as “specified” and
account for its unit-specific emissions instead of having an emissions factor applied.115 If RGGI
chooses to limit specified status to imports that are from historical relationships, incremental
generation capacity at existing facilities, and new facilities, its member states may face the
challenge that a comparable qualification is not present for in-region generators. Again, this
challenge ignores the very real limitations placed on in-state generators in the form of capped
GHG emissions and specific reporting requirements. Because the interaction between existing
source-based regulations and the proposed resource shuffling regulations results in a comparable
hindrance on electricity purchases, a court would probably not find that the resource shuffling
regulations were discriminatory.
Two words of caution, though: first, a court’s willingness to find resource shuffling
regulations non-discriminatory may hinge to some degree on the effects that the application of a
system-based emissions factor would have on out-of-state generators. The use of an emissions
factor will necessarily subject some out-of-state generators to assumptions about their emissions
levels that are higher than their actual emissions levels (for that power that these generators sell
through the wholesale market, rather than through specified contracts).116 These generators may
argue that subjecting them to these harmful assumptions amounts to discrimination, given that
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in-state generators report their actual emissions and therefore are not subjected to these same
potentially harmful assumptions.
We do not believe this feature should doom imports regulations. Because the emissions
factor would necessarily be an average of the emissions in a system, a proportional number of
out-of-state generators would benefit from having the emissions factor applied. Such a shift in
comparative advantage among out-of-state firms is not enough to constitute discrimination
against interstate commerce. The Supreme Court has clearly held that the dormant Commerce
Clause “protects the interstate market, not particular interstate firms.”117 Accordingly, “[t]he fact
that the burden of a state regulation falls on some interstate companies does not, by itself,
establish a claim of discrimination against interstate commerce.”118 Based on this precedent, the
use of an emissions factor appears unlikely to lead to a finding of discrimination.
However, the more that the emissions factor assumptions appear grossly unfair to certain
market participants, the more willing a court might be to view the emissions factor assumptions
as discriminating against out-of-staters, given that in-state firms are not subjected to any similar
assumptions. Thus, to the extent that certain systems differ greatly in their average emissions,
RGGI would be wise to apply a specific emissions factor to each system, rather than use one
default factor as California has done. Use of a more tailored method to calculate emissions
factor might be viewed as creating more justifiably proportionate in- and out-of-state
obligations.119 RGGI should also characterize these systems as accurately as possible, and
update assumptions periodically.

117

Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 127-28 (1978).
Id. at 126.
119
However, under a more tailored approach, cleaner generators within regions that ended up with “dirtier”
emissions factors would perhaps find even more cause to object. But again, a burden imposed on particular out-ofstate generators to the benefit of other out-of-state generators should not amount to discrimination. See id.
118

35

Second, it will be important to pay attention to advancements in GHG regulations in
states outside of RGGI that sell power into the RGGI region.120 If a state abutting the RGGI
region adopts its own cap-and-trade requirements, then power imported from that state would be
double-regulated if RGGI failed to account for the regulatory requirements placed on that state’s
electric generators. To a certain extent, this problem is easily solved by following the lead of
California, which allows allowances from approved, linked jurisdictions to count for compliance
with its scheme.121 We recommend that RGGI consider providing similar opportunities for
exemption from its scheme when electricity is imported from a generator subject to what RGGI
determines to be a comparable cap-and-trade system in its home state, or find some alternative
method of properly accounting for the existence of an out-of-region cap-and-trade program.
Perhaps more complicated is the question of what to do in those situations where an outof-region generator is subject to some GHG compliance obligations in its home state, but
something that falls short of an equivalent cap-and-trade scheme. Generators in this situation
might justly assert that to require RGGI LSEs to cover the full value of their emissions would
discriminate against them as compared to RGGI generators, who would be able to sell power
more cheaply because they would not be subject to dual compliance obligations in and out of
RGGI. At this point, a situation along these lines appears purely hypothetical, as no state selling
into RGGI has a firm GHG reduction obligation imposed on its generators.122 Nevertheless,
RGGI might consider building some flexibility into any imports scheme to help deal with this
problem should it arise in the future. Perhaps some sort of variance or credit could be granted to
120
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electricity imported into RGGI from certain states that adopt GHG regulations producing
measurable emissions reductions but not amounting to an equivalent cap-and-trade scheme.
RGGI might consider including in any imports regulations adopted a procedure by which parties
could petition to have certain out-of-region GHG compliance obligations granted equivalency
status, or partial RGGI credit, as appropriate.123
ii. Resource shuffling regulations do not negate a valid
competitive advantage held by out-of-state generators.
Out-of-state generators may contend that requiring FJDs or LSEs to purchase allowances
to cover emissions associated with imported electricity will effectively negate any competitive
advantage they have from producing cheaper, dirtier electricity. This argument would follow the
contours sketched out in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission.124 In Hunt,
the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a statute that prohibited all closed
containers of apples sold or shipped in North Carolina from bearing any grade other than the
applicable federal grade.125 The statute was contested by Washington State, which had
established its own stringent, mandatory inspection program in order to protect and enhance the
reputation of Washington apples.126 Washington’s program employed a grading system that was
consistently equivalent or superior to the comparable, national grades.127
The Court invalidated the North Carolina statute for three reasons. The Court found that
it “rais[ed] the costs of doing business in the North Carolina market for Washington apple
growers and dealers” without a similar effect on their North Carolina counterparts, as
123
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Washington entities were forced to alter their marketing practices.128 The statute was also
offensive to the dormant Commerce Clause because it “stripp[ed] away from the Washington
apple industry the competitive and economic advantages it ha[d] earned for itself through its
expensive inspection and grading system.”129 Finally, the Court ruled that “because of the
statute's operation, Washington apples which would otherwise qualify for and be sold under the
superior Washington grades [would] now have to be marketed under their inferior USDA
counterparts” and that “[s]uch ‘downgrading’ offer[ed] the North Carolina apple industry the
very sort of protection against competing out-of-state products that the Commerce Clause was
designed to prohibit.”130
Challengers might try to suggest that, just as in Hunt, subjecting FJDs or LSEs to carbon
regulations for the power they import will destroy the competitive advantage out-of-state
generators enjoy in producing electricity that is not regulated for carbon. However, the
conditions present in Hunt are not applicable in the context of resource shuffling regulations.
Out-of-state generators do not have to alter their business practices in any way to continue
participating in the regulated states’ electricity markets. In Hunt, Washington apple growers and
dealers were forced to adjust their longstanding packaging practices in order to legally enter the
North Carolina market at all.131 No such obligation would apply to out-of-state generators as a
result of resource shuffling regulations; the full scope of compliance obligations would fall on
FJDs or LSEs within RGGI states. Moreover, unlike the statute in Hunt, applying these resource
shuffling regulations would not negate a quality-based advantage that another state specifically
worked to develop. Instead, it would prevent important GHG regulations from being rendered
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futile by emissions leaking to out-of-state generators that had taken no action to control GHG
emissions, unlike their in-region counterparts. Responding to this argument again reflects the
need to emphasize the interaction between resource shuffling regulations and direct regulations
on in-state generators. Because of this interaction, we believe a court would be unlikely to find
that resource shuffling regulations are a discriminatory measure.
One final point on the topic of discrimination: some have expressed concern over the
impact that Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, the California district court decision
concerning that state’s low carbon fuel standard (LCFS) mentioned earlier with respect to
extraterritoriality, might have on a court’s determination of whether imports regulations are
discriminatory. The Eastern District of California found California’s LCFS to be facially
discriminatory on the ground that the standard’s design treated Midwest corn-derived ethanol
differently from similar corn-derived ethanol made in California, by assigning Midwest ethanol
higher carbon intensity based on the location of the production facility and the distance the
product traveled.132 This reasoning should not present cause for concern here. The district court
in Goldstene was troubled by the fact that it read California’s calculation methodology as
favoring California ethanol producers over Midwest producers in every instance, by including
distance as a discrete variable in the calculation formula.133 In contrast, the resource shuffling
regulations that we are considering do not exhibit such an in-state preference, instead assigning
an emissions factor to all out-of-state sources simply as the best method of approximating the
requirements already applied to all in-state generators (who will not necessarily fare better under
the regulations than out-of-state generators). Origin does not in and of itself result in an
automatically higher GHG value for out-of-state sources. Furthermore, it bears emphasizing that
132
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the Goldstene decision is merely a single district court opinion and is currently on appeal to the
Ninth Circuit.134 As such, it would serve as persuasive authority at best in any challenge that
RGGI might face.
iii. Resource shuffling regulations might survive a strict
scrutiny inquiry.
As discussed, we think it is unlikely that a court would conclude that regulations
designed to stop resource shuffling are discriminatory. However, if a court decided that resource
shuffling regulations were facially or effectively discriminatory, RGGI states would face the
burden of demonstrating that the regulations were justified in terms of legitimate local benefits
and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives.135 In practice, a finding that a statute is
discriminatory is typically fatal, hence its designation as grounds for “virtually per se”
invalidation.136 Nevertheless, RGGI states would have a reasonable argument that these import
regulations would be a legitimate exception to that virtually automatic unconstitutionality. In
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986), the leading case in which a discriminatory statute was
upheld, the Court allowed Maine’s ban on importing live baitfish to stand because parasites
common to out-of-state baitfish could have a potentially severe effect on Maine’s ecology, and
there was no way to effectively test live baitfish for the parasite.137 The Court viewed the ban as
motivated by reasons distinct from origin, making it acceptable despite its discriminatory
nature.138
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While the exact nature of climate change is not fully understood, the Supreme Court has
agreed that “[t]he harms associated with climate change are serious and well recognized.”139 In
Taylor, the Supreme Court made clear that states have “a legitimate interest in guarding against
imperfectly understood environmental risks, despite the possibility that they may ultimately
prove to be negligible.”140 Thus, resource shuffling regulations would probably be viewed as
addressing a legitimate state interest.
To demonstrate necessity, RGGI states should argue that resource shuffling regulations,
including an assumed emissions factor, would be applied to FJDs and LSEs who import
electricity not due to the origin of the electricity per se, but because of the difficulty in assessing
the exact GHG emissions of out-of-state generators that are not directly subject to the enacting
states’ regulations. Challengers would likely respond that RGGI states could simply enact more
indirect measures to help limit leakage in a less discriminatory fashion, such as stronger in-state
energy efficiency and renewable energy policies.141 There is a rebuttal against this argument in
the case of imports regulations. In Taylor, the Supreme Court specifically said that in order to be
constitutional, a discriminatory statute’s “purpose must be one that cannot be served as well by
available nondiscriminatory means.”142 Even granting that indirect regulations may help mitigate
RGGI states’ GHG footprint, RGGI should be able to demonstrate that they would be far less
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effective in advancing that goal.143 The overriding purpose of resource shuffling regulations
would be to correct a crucial component of the regions’ GHG cap-and-trade program by
eliminating leakage, which might otherwise impair the RGGI program’s effectiveness in
addressing climate change’s harmful impacts on the RGGI region.144 Therefore, it is at least
possible that RGGI states could satisfy the strict scrutiny test applied to discriminatory statutes.
Nevertheless, considering the infrequency with which courts uphold discriminatory statutes,
RGGI would be better served by avoiding a finding that resource shuffling regulations are
discriminatory at all costs.
3. Resource shuffling regulations probably would survive Pike Balancing.
Because we believe that a reviewing court would not hold that resource shuffling
regulations were discriminatory or extraterritorial, it would instead apply the Pike balancing test
in order to decide whether the regulations were constitutional.145 Resource shuffling regulations
stand a good chance of surviving judicial scrutiny under the Pike balancing test. As described
above, in order for a state law to survive the Pike review, it must 1) regulate even-handedly, 2)
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, 3) affect interstate commerce only incidentally, and
4) impose a burden on interstate commerce that is not clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits.146 “State laws frequently survive this Pike scrutiny.”147
143
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Once a court rules that a state law is non-discriminatory, it has functionally decided that
the state law regulates even-handedly and affects interstate commerce only incidentally. The
Pike balancing analysis is therefore really focused on two of the four factors enumerated above:
whether the statute effectuates a legitimate interest and does not excessively burden interstate
commerce.148 We assume that if RGGI states were to adopt resource shuffling regulations, they
would justify them on the ground that they are central to the program’s environmental integrity
and its ability to effectively address the problem of climate change. Here, RGGI could point to
its (predominantly coastal) participating states’ documented concerns over sea level rise and the
corresponding threat to coastal communities and infrastructure, saltwater contamination of
drinking water, beach erosion, and an increase in habitats for disease-carrying insects.149 As
noted supra, Supreme Court precedent has already confirmed that states have a legitimate
interest in guarding against the environmental risks posed by climate change,150 suggesting that
the “legitimate interest” prong of Pike could easily be satisfied. The central question in a Pike
analysis of resource shuffling regulations would likely thus be whether or not the burden
imposed on interstate commerce by resource shuffling regulations would clearly exceed the
putative local benefits derived from those regulations.151
There is a question as to how concrete the benefits sought by a State must be in order to
survive a Pike inquiry. The First Circuit has emphasized that “it is the putative local benefits that
matter. It matters not whether these benefits actually come into being at the end of the day.”152
Yet the Supreme Court has previously held that when a statute placed a “substantial burden on
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interstate commerce and [could not] be said to make more than the most speculative contribution
to [a sought benefit],” it violated the dormant Commerce Clause.153 Taken together, these cases
indicate that, the more certain benefits are, the more willing a court will be to overlook some
burdens on interstate commerce.
We assume that RGGI will not choose to adopt imports regulations unless it also tightens
its cap, such that leakage becomes a more prominent concern.154 Therefore, although there is
some debate over RGGI’s current efficacy in reducing GHGs given the precipitous drop in
emissions that occurred after its initial cap was set, it should be the case that once RGGI might
be in the position of defending imports regulations, it would be able to prove that the RGGI
scheme would result in more than speculative GHG reductions. The states would be best served
by framing the regulation broadly, focusing attention on the combined effects of resource
shuffling regulations and the existing in-state source-based regulations. The benefits of resource
shuffling regulations become more obvious and concrete when appropriately considered within
the broad regulatory scheme. RGGI states should further elucidate this connection by
documenting the potentially deleterious effects that leakage and resource shuffling could have on
their goal of reducing their GHG footprint.
Opponents might also turn to the argument that the GHG reductions resulting from RGGI
alone would not save participating states from the harms of climate change, such that RGGI does
not produce a real benefit. RGGI states’ strongest response is that RGGI is part of their
contribution to solving a global problem, adopted partly with the hope and expectation that it will
spur action elsewhere. Massachusetts v. EPA supports the position that states have a strong—
and indeed, special—interest in preventing the harms associated with climate change, even
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though the problem is a global one.155 Moreover, to further emphasize the benefits of RGGI,
RGGI states might point to the recent study that found that RGGI also confers substantial
economic benefits on its participants.156 Taken as a whole, then, we believe there is a good case
to be made that the RGGI regime, including imports regulations, brings substantial state benefits.
These benefits must be weighed against out-of-state burdens. As discussed earlier, outof-state generators that sell unspecified power into a power system with an emissions factor
higher than the generators’ actual emissions portfolios probably would have the strongest
argument of a disproportionate burden. But again, just as this burden on a few generators should
not lead to a finding of discrimination, it is also unlikely to amount to an impermissible burden
on interstate commerce. In Exxon, the Supreme Court held that “interstate commerce is not
subjected to an impermissible burden simply because an otherwise valid regulation causes some
business to shift from one interstate supplier to another.”157 Here, even if application of a
system-wide emissions factor causes FJDs or LSEs to obtain less electricity from certain out-ofstate generators, it does not necessarily mean that business will shift to in-state generators. It is
just as likely that the demand will be serviced by other out-of-state generation facilities,
including new, clean, out-of-state generation facilities, which would be permitted to sell to FJDs
or LSEs as specified sources not subject to the emissions factor assumptions.
If RGGI adopts a non-uniform emissions factor calculation method, there will be an even
greater likelihood that only some out-of-state generators would be burdened, as opposed to the
interstate market as a whole. In-state FJDs or LSEs would presumably shift their purchases to
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those generators that can offer the best combination of electricity price and low GHG emissions.
Furthermore, taking the regulatory scheme as a whole, those in-state generators who are forced
to spend heavily in order to comply with their own caps will need to pass the costs along to FJDs
and LSEs. Combined, these burdens on FJDs/LSEs and in-state generators simply seek to
accomplish the goal of reducing RGGI states’ carbon footprint, and do not impermissibly burden
interstate commerce in the process.
In sum, because hypothetical resource shuffling regulations would not deal with any
transactions occurring entirely out-of-state, we believe a court would be unlikely to find them
unconstitutional as an extraterritorial regulation. Likewise, a court would probably find that these
regulations do not discriminate against out-of-state commerce, as they simply impose a cost on
FJDs or LSEs who import electricity that is comparable to the cost already imposed on in-state
generators subject to RGGI’s cap-and-trade system. If this is correct, and a reviewing court
ultimately applied the Pike balancing test to these regulations, we believe that, since the
regulations would serve an important purpose and would not obviously result in a shift in
demand from out-of-state electricity to in-state electricity, there is a good chance that the court
would uphold the regulations as a constitutionally valid exercise of state power.
IV. THE FEDERAL POWER ACT
Opponents to imports regulations might also argue that such measures are preempted by
the FPA, which grants the federal government exclusive jurisdiction in some areas of electricity
regulation. We believe that this is a relatively weaker argument than a dormant Commerce
Clause claim and would not be likely to succeed, for reasons explained below.
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a.

Overview of Preemption and the FPA

The doctrine of preemption is derived from the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution,158 which makes federal law the supreme law of the land and thus implies that state
laws that contradict federal law cannot stand.159 Congressional intent “is the ultimate touchstone
in every pre-emption case.”160 However, findings of preemption are not favored; the presumption
against preemption dictates that in all preemption cases, courts “start with the assumption that
the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”161 These are the two “cornerstones” that go
into any preemption analysis.
Preemption can be either express or implied. Express preemption arises when Congress
makes explicit in a statute its intent for Federal legislation to have preemptive effect. 162 Implied
preemption results when “compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical
impossibility,”163 when state law impedes the federal law’s objective,164 or when “[t]he scheme
of federal regulation . . . [is] so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left
no room for the States to supplement it.”165
The FPA’s primary purpose is “to regulate the rates and charges of . . . interstate
energy”166 for “the protection of the public interest generally, [and] likewise the interest of the
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consumer and the investor.”167 The FPA grants the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) jurisdiction over “the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale
of such energy at wholesale in interstate commerce.”168 It also tasks FERC with setting “just and
reasonable” rates for wholesale power.169 The Supreme Court has interpreted these grants of
authority to give FERC “exclusive jurisdiction over the rates to be charged . . . interstate
wholesale customers.”170 However, the FPA also specifies that FERC’s jurisdiction “extend[s]
only to those matters which are not subject to regulation by the States.”171
b.

FPA Preemption of Imports Regulations

We believe that imports regulations would likely withstand an FPA preemption
challenge. First, the FPA contains no statement of express preemption.172 Consequently, if the
FPA were to preempt state imports policies, it would have to be through implied preemption. But
we do not believe there is a strong argument to be made that imports regulations interfere with
FERC’s jurisdiction over interstate transmission or the wholesale electricity market in such a
way that implied preemption could attach.
The strongest argument that could be made in favor of implied preemption by opponents
of imports regulations would likely be along the following lines: imports regulations would
directly affect wholesale electricity rates by adding to the cost of any out-of-state power
imported into the RGGI region an additional cost for allowances to cover associated GHG
emissions. In this way, opponents might claim that imports regulations would infringe upon
FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction over wholesale rates.
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This is not a particularly convincing argument.173 Although the FPA declares that the
federal government is expressly imbued with the power to regulate “the sale of . . . energy at
wholesale in interstate commerce,”174 it limits the extent of this “only to those matters which are
not subject to regulation by the States.”175 This is a clear textual indication that the drafters of
the FPA did not intend for the statute to preempt all state activity in the field of electricity supply
and demand, even when state regulation might incidentally affect wholesale prices.176
Of potential relevance to the determination of whether imports regulations might
impermissibly infringe on wholesale rate setting are recent controversies over the permissibility
of state feed-in tariffs. A feed-in tariff is a policy instrument that guarantees developers of
renewable generation a certain price, or a fixed premium above the spot market price.177 This
fixed-price guarantee increases the price certainty for renewables—a strategy that has proven
very successful in incentivizing new renewable generation in European countries that have
adopted it.178 As U.S. states have begun adopting feed-in tariffs, challengers have questioned
their viability under the FPA, as they essentially mandate a certain wholesale price be paid for
renewable electricity purchases.179
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combined heat and power, FERC issued an opinion that at least places limits on the way that
feed-in tariffs can be designed.180
Unlike feed-in tariffs, however, imports regulations would not mandate a particular
purchase price for certain types of wholesale electricity. Instead, imports regulations would
place a separate obligation on LSEs or FJDs to purchase emissions allowances to cover
emissions associated with their electricity purchases. By imposing these compliance obligations,
the regulations would create an added cost for retail customers and new incentives for LSEs and
FJDs to try to keep costs low. The regulations might therefore affect the business incentives and
portfolio choices that LSEs or FJDs make in their wholesale purchasing decisions, but this is a
far cry from directly mandating wholesale purchase rates.181 This distinction is an important one
that should save imports regulations from the same potential FPA vulnerability faced by feed-in
tariffs. Imports regulations are more easily analogized to renewable portfolio standards (RPS),
which require utilities to purchase certain percentages of renewables and thereby indirectly
impact wholesale market choices, but do not directly dictate wholesale market prices. And FERC
has indicated that it believes RPS-type state policies to be permissible.182
Further support for imports regulations’ permissibility can be found outside the FPA
context in the Supreme Court’s consideration of analogous statutes. In particular, several
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commentators have pointed to the Supreme Court’s consideration of the Atomic Energy Act in
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission
(“PG&E”).183 Similar to the FPA, the Atomic Energy Act splits authority between the states
and the federal government: whereas the “federal government maintains complete control of the
safety and ‘nuclear’ aspects of energy generation,” states maintain “their traditional authority
over the need for additional generating capacity, the type of generating facilities to be licensed,
land use, ratemaking, and the like.”184 Petitioners in PG&E asserted that a California regulation
requiring nuclear developers to demonstrate adequate capacity for a proposed plant’s spent fuel
rods in order to gain state approval for the plant was preempted by the Atomic Energy Act. The
Court disagreed, holding that because the Atomic Energy Act occupied only the field of nuclear
safety, state regulations not passed for the purpose of regulating nuclear safety were permissible.
Because California justified its spent fuel rods regulation on economic grounds, rather than
nuclear safety grounds, the court found it not to be preempted, even though it clearly impacted
whether and when nuclear plants could be built.185
PG&E supports the conclusion that state import regulations enacted for the purpose of
controlling leakage should be similarly permissible. As discussed above, although such
regulations might indirectly impact wholesale power rates, they are not aimed at ratemaking as
an end goal. Instead, import regulations would serve the purpose of ensuring the environmental
integrity of the RGGI program, thereby preserving participating states’ environments and
contributing to the health and safety of their citizens. Such goals are well within traditional state
police powers and therefore should fall outside of FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction over wholesale
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power rates.186 Language from Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v. Kansas, a case considering
federal preemption under the Natural Gas Act (an act that reserves less power for the states than
the FPA), further supports this conclusion.187 There, the Court stated that “[w]here state law
impacts on matters within FERC’s control, the State’s purpose must be to regulate production or
other subjects of state jurisdiction, and the means chosen must at least plausibly be related to
matters of legitimate state concern.”188 This test would likely be met for import regulations, as
long as an emissions leakage problem could be demonstrated.
In sum, we do not think imports regulations are likely to be held to be preempted by the
FPA. The FPA expressly left room for state regulation within the electricity field on matters
other than wholesale ratesetting and interstate transmission, and imports regulations would be a
valid use of traditional state authority to regulate health and environmental impacts.
V.

SPECIAL ISSUES RELATING TO CANADIAN IMPORTS
In addition to importing power from neighboring U.S. states that are not participating in

RGGI, RGGI states also import power from three Canadian provinces: Quebec, Ontario, and
New Brunswick. There are two additional legal issues worth flagging with respect to regulation
of imports from Canada. First, RGGI should be aware that a dormant Commerce Clause analysis
may differ slightly with respect to electricity imported from Canada. Case law on this point is
sparse, particularly outside of the taxation context. The Supreme Court has indicated, however,
that when considering the validity of a regulation under the dormant foreign Commerce Clause,
courts should also consider the potential for international multiple taxation and whether a state
186
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policy would prevent the Federal Government from speaking with “one voice when regulating
commercial relations with foreign governments.”189
On the topic of double taxation, it is important to note that Quebec will be implementing
its own cap-and-trade system in 2013.190 It is not clear whether imports regulations would
amount to a “tax” per se, such that they would implicate any of the double-taxation issues that
often arise in the foreign dormant Commerce Clause context.191 Nevertheless, RGGI should
consider how it wants to treat electricity imported from Quebec. To subject Quebecois imports
to the same compliance obligations as imports not subject to any carbon cap would arguably
double-count emissions associated with their electricity production. This would unfairly
disadvantage Quebecois generators, particularly given the relative stringency of Quebec’s cap
vis-à-vis the cap currently imposed by RGGI states on in-state generators. There might be
several ways to go about ensuring that imports from Quebec receive fair treatment in RGGI, the
technical details of which are beyond the scope of this analysis. For present purposes, the bottom
line is that RGGI should work to find a way to treat imports from Quebec appropriately in order
to avoid any foreign dormant Commerce Clause concerns.
Second, there is a potential North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) issue that
could arise with respect to how Canadian versus U.S. government-owned hydropower is treated.
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In California’s scheme, one of the exceptions to its prohibition against “specified” contracts is
deliveries from federally-owned hydropower facilities, from their exclusive marketers, or
otherwise allocated by contract with the federal government.192 British Columbia Hydro has
objected to this exception being extended only to U.S.-owned hydropower, arguing that
Canadian government-owned hydropower deserves the same exceptions.193 Otherwise, it has
argued, California’s regulations risk running afoul of NAFTA.194 Given its different and in some
ways more sophisticated technical capabilities to track imports, RGGI may be able to avoid the
need faced in California to grant federal hydropower a resource shuffling exemption, and thus
might not face this same legal challenge. But RGGI states should be aware of this issue if they
move forward in designing imports regulations.
CONCLUSION
Based on our analysis of the dormant Commerce Clause and the FPA, we believe that the
imports regulations are likely to ultimately be ruled constitutional by a reviewing court. In order
to better assure this finding, we believe that RGGI would be best served by applying a tailored
emissions factor that reflects the approximate emission levels of various geographic regions that
produce electricity. By doing this, RGGI would have a stronger argument that the emissions
factor method is intended to, and does, reflect the relative cleanliness of electricity generation
and is not merely a penalty imposed on FJDs or LSEs who procure electricity from out-of-state.
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By avoiding the appearance of legislating or regulating in a discriminatory, protectionist fashion,
RGGI states are more likely able to combat emissions leakage in a legally permissible way.
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